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THE WAR — ITS PRACTICAL 
LESSONS TO DEMOCRACY 




ANOTHER I. S. & E. BOOKLET 



THE WAR— ITS PRACTICAL 
LESSONS TO DEMOCRACY 



By DR. FREDERICK A. CLEVELAND, Secretary, 
THE INDUSTRIAL SERVIC^E & EQUIPMENT CO., 
226 DEVONSHIRE STREET, BOSTON, MASS. 



it 



A PAPER READ BEFORE THE NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE 

AT A CONFERENCE HELD IN DETROIT, 

NOVEMBER 22, 1917. 



KAf ^■' ^^ 



-4 



FOREWORD 



WHILE this address deals with problems of public 
business, the underlying principles discussed are 
those which should be kept constantly in mind, 
both by the management and those who benefit by the 
efficient management of enterprise. In fact, a standard 
textbook on the subject of " Management " could be 
written around what, in this, are called the five essen- 
tials of success in the struggle of Democracy to survive, 
namely: — 

A strong, intelligent leadership. 

A well-disciplined line organization. 

A well-trained staff organization. 

A regularly constituted forum for independent in- 
quiry and discussion of results and proposals, and for 
the determination of questions of policy. 

A prompt and effective means of electoral control. 

Every competitor of business is in a struggle to sur- 
vive. We do not call it war, but failure to compete 
means that it would be wiped out as surely as would 
France by the success of Prussian Autocracy. Substi- 
tute the owner or stock-holder for elector and the public, 
and the foregoing may be accepted as the five essentials 
of the successful management of a great industry or any 
number of them. 



Conversely, it is fitting to know what is needed in 
this hour of National emergency is an organization, a 
leadership, a discipline, and expert staff guidance which 
makes for the conservation of every available resource. 

To this in both public and private business, we must 
add those factors which will make our institutions sub- 
servient to common welfare as interpreted by a majority 
— the principle of democracy. 

GEORGE F. WILLETT. 



WHY THIS SERIES OF BOOKLETS 
IS ISSUED 



THE primary function of the Industrial Service 
& Equipment Company is to serve. It serves as 
an aid to corporate management. Successful 
management depends upon effective leadership which 
in turn must be premised on co-operation. Every man, 
no matter what his place, must be depended upon to do 
his part. Neither leadership nor co-operation in sup- 
port of leadership is possible without community of 
understanding. This is quite as needful as a commun- 
ity of interest. 

This series of pamphlets is one of the ways in which 
the Industrial Service & Equipment Company is re- 
sponding to requests of its clientele for service on the 
educational side. It is supplementary to our periodical 
" Industrial Service " — the latter being a mirror by 
which the esprit de corps of the various associated com- 
panies is reflected. 

The pamphlets are intended for contributions which 
are not suited to the periodical, but which it is thought 
may be helpful to getting and giving a broader and 
clearer vision of the duties and responsibilities of each 
member of the Willett-Sears Group, who is joining in 
the common effort to make good to opportunity. 



THE WAR— ITS PRACTICAL 
LESSONS TO DEMOCRACY 

ESSENTIAL DEFECTS IN THE POLITICAL MACHINERY 
OF THE NATIONS OPPOSED TO PRUSSIAN AUTOCRACY.* 




N this national emergency, when 
estimated public expenditures 
run into figures that no man can 
grasp, when in one year the de- 
mands on the Treasury promise 
to equal the total cost of government from 
the time of our Independence, including the 
total cost of five other wars, we are beginning 
to think on the subject of President Taft's 
special message to Congress — " The Need 
for a National Budget." The need for plan- 
ning is so obvious that we now are debating 
what kind of a budget we shall have. And 
in this debate it is taken for granted that I am 
at all times and under all conditions in favor 

*Paper read by Frederick A. Cleveland at the annual confer- 
ence of the National Municipal League at Detroit, November 
22, in discussion of the general topic, " Should the Executive 
Frame the Budget." 

7 



THE WAR — ITS PRACTICAL 

of the proposition that " The Executive 
Should Frame the Budget." Nothing could 
be farther from the truth. What seems to be 
missed is this : — that before we can intelli- 
gently decide a question of procedure, we must 
decide a great constitutional question, viz: 
" What kind of a government shall we have.^ " 
A budget at best is only an instrument of 
control. With much reason it has been 
likened to the governor on an engine. Just 
imagine ourselves met here (not as a group of 
men who have given years of our lives to the 
consideration of the practical workings of the 
machinery of governments) but as a society 
of mechanical engineers. Then imagine 
that one of this number were asked to speak 
of this text: " Every prime mover should be 
equipped with a centrifugal ball and plunger 
governor." In perfect candor, with all scien- 
tific reasoning and human experience back of 
the conclusion, in one breath the question 
might be answered " no; " and with equal 
candor, in another breath it could be answered 
" yes." The only way it could be answered 
at all without the logic of the speaker being 
open to challenge, would be to say at the 

8 



LESSONS TO DEMOCRACY 



beginning what the engineer would say: It 
all depends. It depends on what is the kind 
of a prime mover on which the instrument of 
control is to be used." If it is to be used on a 
stationary steam engine, " well and good. 
If it is proposed to use it on an internal com- 
bustion gas engine, a water wheel, or a tread- 
mill " no " If, however, we first take up the 
question as to what kind of an engine we shall 
have, then we may with some intelligence 
discuss the different forms of devices adapted 
to the control of the prime mover that is 
selected. 

Two Types of Political Engines. 

The engines of democracy are now being 
tested in a very practical way. In this war the 
most powerful political machinery ot_ the 
world has been brought into competition 
Generally speaking, the engines to be tested 
are of two types: (1) the type developed by 
patronizing Prussian autocracy; (2) the type 
developed by the master builders of democ- 
racy The efficiency of the first type has 
been demonstrated. When the war broke 
out this was all tuned up ready for action. 



THE WAR — ITS PRACTICAL 

The engines of democracy were not even as- 
sembled for use. The world is waiting in al- 
most breathless suspense to know whether^ 
when they are assembled and tuned up, a like 
efficiency can be developed. For the engines 
that have been made to serve democratic 
people must demonstrate their superiority or 
accept defeat. 

But the very arrogance of those who direct 
and control the great Prussian political ma- 
chines as they have run Juggernaut-like over 
intervening small nations, crushing their way 
into the very workshop of their challengers in 
the face of allied opposition, may prove a 
blessing in disguise. It has brought inde- 
pendent free people to realize that something 
essential has been left out of their engines of 
war; that something has also been left out of 
their engines of peace — as a result of which 
they have so far been at a disadvantage. 

Distressing as all this has been, the shock, 
the feeling of insecurity, the necessity for 
making democracy safe in the world, has put 
the master builders to work anew. They 
now see that they must build an engine which 
is efficient as well as safe. They realize for 

10 



LESSONS TO DEMOCRACY 

the first time that in their constitution build- 
ing they must have in mind not only the desire 
for freedom, but there must also be strength 
for service — that they must conserve all of 
the forces and resources that are within their 
command. They have found this out by 
being confronted by the most efficient war and 
peace organization that the world has ever 
known — an organization that now threatens 
to crush out freedom and impose a paternalism 
that knows no limitations. 

What the Master Builders of Democracy Have 
to Guide Them. 

Fortunately, in preparing to meet this com- 
petition, the master builders of democracy 
need not work in the dark. They know what 
is the principle that gives strength to the 
Prussian political machine. They know also 
what are the elements of weakness in the 
engines of democracy. They know that the 
Prussian machine was built around strong 
executive leadership, unencumbered by any 
form of restraint, except such as autocracy 
has chosen to put on itself. They know that 
in its initial planning democracy purposely 

11 



THE WAR — ITS PRACTICAL 

deprived itself of the benefits of strong execu- 
tive leadership in the fear that it would become 
autocratic. 

Democracies are now face to face with the 
necessity of so organizing that they may have 
the benefits of an executive leadership which 
can deliver every ounce of energy, use every 
human and material resource at their com- 
mand, and at the same time make this execu- 
tive leadership at all times subservient to the 
will of the people. Unity of effort, centralized 
direction, discipline which makes for highest 
efficiency and under democratic control, — 
these are the objectives to be reached in the 
adjusting and tuning up processes that are 
now going on. 

The Principle of Centralized Direction. 

This is only another way of stating the 
principle announced by the heads of the three 
greatest democracies engaged in this struggle. 
Within the last week, the Prime Minister of 
France, M. Painleve, at the Paris Conference 
is reported to have said : 

" The enemies ' alliance reached unity of 
effort by brutal discipline, one of the peoples 

12 



LESSONS TO DEMOCRACY 

among them having mastered the others and 
rendered them serviceable. 

" We do not admit of subjection to other 
people. * * * Xo reconcile independence 
with the need for unity of direction," that is 
the accomplishment which M. Painleve points 
to as necessary to the success of democracy. 
And this principle of centralized executive is 
to be applied not alone to the organized forces 
of a single nation, but in this emergency to 
all of the forces of the allied powers. 

Unfortunately, the French people were not 
quite ready to accept the conclusion. M. 
Painleve had taken too long a step in advance. 
The next day he received a vote of lack of 
confidence from the French Parliament and 
leadership was turned over to M. Clemenceau. 
But Lloyd George returning home, being 
questioned by Asquith, the leader of the 
opposition, boldly asserted the same doctrine. 
And the faith which was inspired by a century 
of effective control over the strongest national 
leadership that the British Empire has yet 
developed and without intrusion on the ideals 
of human liberty or suggestion of usurpation, 
gave a majority vote in the representative 

13 



THE WAR — ITS PRACTICAL 

body to the British Prime Minister in favor 
of the application of this same principle to 
secure the benefits of international co-opera- 
tion. 

Perhaps by coincidence, perhaps by pre- 
arrangement, the day before Lloyd George's 
speech, the democracies of the world break- 
fasted with these headlines before them: 

" President Wilson cables to get together." 

The Washington news dispatch read like 
this: 

" President Wilson's message to Colonel 
House declared for unity of plan and control 
over the conduct of the war for all the Allies. 
He laid down the principle that unity must 
be accomplished if the great resources of the 
United States are to be used to the best ad- 
vantage." 

Here is an agreement as to what that some- 
thing is which has been left out of the machine 
through which well directed and well disci- 
plined forces of democracy are to meet and 
overcome the organized and disciplined forces 
of autocracy. And I venture there is scarcely 
an American who will not give affirmation to 
the views expressed by our President. Why? 

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LESSONS TO DEMOCRACY 



Because it is consonant with common ex- 
perience and common sense; because there is 
not a part of the poHtical mechanism required 
to enable democracy to become both more 
highly efficient than Prussian autocracy and 
at the same time conform to the most exacting 
demands and highest ideals of popular sover- 
eignty — there is not a part which has not 
been fully developed and tried out. The 
only thing that stands in the way is mass 
inertia, — the difficulty of making an insti- 
tutional change in a democracy even when 
the people are dissatisfied. 

Five Essentials to Successful Management of 
a Democracy. 

As has been said, we know the requirements. 
They are simple. Every one of them are 
necessary to success in this great contest — 
viz: 

(1) Strong Executive Leadership — the 
stronger the better, the strongest that democ- 
racy can produce, with no limitations or in- 
hibitions so long as this leadership has the 
support of those who are served. 

(2) A Well- Disciplined Line Organization — 
an organized personnel as large as may be 

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THE WAR — ITS PRACTICAL 

needed to execute orders, to do the things 
that the people need to have done without 
waste of human or material resources. 

(3) A highly specialized staff organization 
— an organized personnel, trained and set 
aside to study and report facts and conditions 
that must be taken into account by the 
leadership; the means of obtaining the best 
possible basis for the exercise of discretion, 
of developing a management which is made 
intelligent through staff knowledge as well as 
made strong through line discipline. 

(4) Adequate facilities for inquiry, criticism, 
discussion and publicity by a responsible per- 
sonnel which is independent of the executive — 
the making of the representative body a real 
forum with full opportunity given to a re- 
sponsible critical opposition under the leader- 
ship of persons who are well trained in the 
public service, a leadership as strong as that 
at the head of the administration. 

(5) The means of effective control in the 
hands of the people and their representatives — a 
control through which at any time, simply by 
adverse vote, the sceptre of power can be taken 

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LESSONS TO DEMOCRACY 

away from the executive and put into the 
hands of another, without loss of line disci- 
pline, staff knowledge, or managerial experience, 

without loss of an ounce of efficiency, enabling 
democracy to change engineers at any time 
without stopping or slowing down the engine. 
The first three of these are the essentials of 
an efficient government. The last two are the 
essentials of democratic control. 

The Prussians Use Only the First Three. 

The builders of the Prussian political engine 
used the first three principles only — they 
had no interest In democracy except to crush 
it. They left out of their mechanism the 
principles which made for democratic control 
— gaining the loyal support and contentment 
of the people through a paternalistic service 
in the same way as did the head of the family 
under the old Mosaic law, and by developing a 
culture which left no alternative open to the 
individual other than to accept this benevolent 
paternalism enforced by a penal practice that 
because of Its added horrors has become known 
as the doctrine of Schrecklichkeit. 

17 



THE WAR — ITS PRACTICAL 



Britain Left Out the Second and Third. 

Great Britain in building up her imperial 
organization has stressed the first, the fourth, 
and the fifth of these principles. Britain has 
provided for leadership, but she has from the 
first insisted that this leadership shall be 
responsible and therefore the attention of 
British statesmen has been devoted primarily 
to expedients which will insure democratic 
control. Because of her national strength, 
because of her predominance, because of her 
isolated position and her control over the sea, 
however, it was not until the beginning of this 
war that Britons were made to see the neces- 
sity for utilizing the second and third principles 
— the necessity of providing for a well disci- 
plined line and a well trained scientific staflp. 

France Used All. 

France had developed an engine in which 
all five of these essential principles of political 
mechanics were used to good effect, but she 
had not the human or material resources to 
build it large enough and strong enough to 
successfully compete with the Prussians, and 

18 



LESSONS TO DEMOCRACY 



it was only through brave Belgium's sacrifice 
that France was saved from destruction. 

Russia provided for leadership but did not 
make it strong, and neglected all of the other 
four essentials. It was nothing but her mass 
weight and size that held the Prussian war 
engine on her border. 

America Has Left Out All of Them. 

America has developed a type of engine of 
her own — one built in disregard of all of these 
great principles. The most conspicuous thing 
in all American constitutions is fear of strong 
executive leadership. We have not developed 
a well disciplined line organization. We have 
not developed a strong, intelligent staff — in 
fact this is a thing impossible to do with- 
out strong executive leadership. We have 
not developed adequate facilities for inde- 
pendent responsible inquiry, criticism, dis- 
cussion and publicity. We have not de- 
veloped means of effective control in the 
hands of the people and their representatives. 

With these known requirements and defects, 
we now have before us the largest, the most 
vital political question that we have ever 

19 



THE WAR — ITS PRACTICAL 

had to decide. It is this: Whether we and our 
allies will be able to so far adapt and tune up 
our political machinery that we may demon- 
strate in actual competition with the engines 
of v/ar in the hands of a Prussian autocracy 
an efficiency that is adequate for self-pro- 
tection and at the same time one which may be 
consistent with the aims and purposes of 
democracy. Russia has already gone to 
pieces under the strain. Italy is shaking in 
every part. The burden has fallen on Great 
Britain, France and America. It is for them 
to develop and effectively use a political ma- 
chine in which these five principles are so well 
balanced, and in which each part of the me- 
chanism is so well adjusted that all the im- 
pulses, all the intelligence, and all the re- 
sources of democracy may be brought into 
play with the elements of waste and loss re- 
duced to the minimum, thereby demonstrat- 
ing to the world that democracy is able better 
to conserve the things on which humanity 
must depend for its welfare than can the de- 
signers of the most effective, the best organ- 
ized, the most intelligent autocracy that has 
ever reached out for world power. 

20 



LESSONS TO DEMOCRACY 



The Allies Must Become Both More Efficient 
and More Democratic. 

It is believed that democracy will success- 
fully meet this test. But it will meet it, not 
by decrying Prussian efficiency, but by be- 
coming more efficient than Germany, and 
more democratic than America. It is believed 
that it will meet the most exalting demands 
made upon it because the most effective prin- 
ciples of management and control^ that are 
known are consistent with the spirit of free- 
dom. When these principles are successfully 
applied, democracy will develop the fullest 
measure of strength because under a regime in 
which strong leadership is reconciled with 
freedom an esprit de corps is made possible 
which cannot be found among people who ac- 
cept the dictates of an irresponsible Caesar, 
and who, like dumb driven cattle, put their 
necks under the yoke. 

But the salvation of democracy depends on its 
ability under stress to apply and use the first 
three of these principles in such manner that 
all the combined forces of the Allies may work 
together with the singleness of purpose pointed 
out as essential at the Paris Conference. 

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THE WAR — ITS PRACTICAL 

The Budget as a Means of Enforcing Democracy 
on Efficient Leadership, 

With these broad principles in mind let us 
return to the subject immediately before us — 
the budget as an instrument of democratic 
control. 

I wish the members of this Conference to get 
clearly before them this point, that an execu- 
tive budget is essentially an instrument of con- 
trol in the hands of a representative body over 
a strong executive leadership and its use is to 
make that leadership responsible to the people 
through their representatives. When, there- 
fore, I have said that I believe in an executive 
budget, it has not been because I believe that 
an executive budget is practical or even pos- 
sible under conditions as they exist in America 
today. I believe in the executive budget be- 
cause I believe in the principles of responsible 
executive leadership. Given this as an es- 
sential to an efficient organization, the re- 
quirement that the executive shall frame the 
budget, that the executive shall prepare, sub- 
mit, explain and defend both his acts and pro- 
posals before the representative body, that he 
shall do this in such a manner as to retain the 

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LESSONS TO DEMOCRACY 

support of a majority of that body before 
further supplies are granted, this follows as a 
means of rendering the Government responsive 
to the will of the people. 

I wish the members of this Conference also 
to get this other point: — that such a proce- 
dure, such a method of control, is adapted to 
one general type of democratic machine only: 
that the executive budget Is adapted for use as 
a controlling device only when the executive 
is made the prime mover, and when having 
been put in the position of leader, he Is to be 
made responsible; that it Is adapted for use 
only when the executive can be put on trial 
to defend his leadership at any moment, and 
can retain it only so long as he is trusted, and 
supported by a majority; that it is adapted 
only to a progressive government because so 
long as the executive is trusted and supported 
by a majority can he have the power to direct 
and use all the human and material resources 
of the politically organized commonwealth 
or federation for common welfare ends, but 
just the moment he is not trusted (whether 
because he was going too fast, or because he 
was going in a direction that the people or 

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THE WAR — ITS PRACTICAL 

a majority of their representatives do not ap- 
prove, or because he had failed to use the 
powers at his command in a manner responsive 
to their wishes) for any reason and at any time, 
the sceptre of power can be snatched from his 
hand; that it is adapted to a democratic 
government because by its use, with a strong 
responsible executive, the will of the people 
is the power behind this leadership — the 
force that makes autocratic leadership im- 
possible because at any time the autocrat can 
be deprived of his position simply by a vote 
of lack of confidence, because he may be de- 
posed and some one whose leadership will be 
supported may be put in his place. 

Extensive Budget Possible Only When Respon- 
sible Publicity and Prompt Electoral Control 
are Provided. 

Having provided for strong leadership, then 
a well disciplined line and well organized staff 
follows. But an executive budget procedure, 
in order to operate effectively as an instrument 
of democratic control, must be premised on the 
two other principles mentioned, namely: (1) 
adequate facilities for independent inquiry, 

24 



LESSONS TO DEMOCRACY 

criticism, discussion and publicity by a re- 
sponsible personnel independent of the execu- 
tive and (2) a means of effective control in the 
hands of the people or their representatives. 

The first of these principles means that the 
representative body shall not be responsible 
for leadership in matters of administration; 
that each member shall be free and inde- 
pendent of the executive; and that this body 
shall be so organized and conducted that it will 
be a real forum in which full opportunity will 
be given to each member to put himself in the 
attitude of criticism to ally himself with a 
critical opposition under the leadership of 
persons who are as well trained in the public 
service and as competent and as strong as the 
leadership which is at the head of the adminis- 
tration. 

The second principle referred to requires 
that the people shall have in their hands and 
in the hands of their representatives a recog- 
nized procedure which may at any time be 
called into operation for the purpose of finding 
out whether those who are looked to for execu- 
tive leadership will be supported in any act or 
proposal brought under critical review by 

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THE WAR — ITS PRACTICAL 

those who oppose, and of determining whether 
the organized, well disciplined line forces of 
democracy, operating under the staff guidance 
provided to assist the management, is being 
used in a manner which meets with popular 
approval. 

It is in these respects that our own Govern- 
ment has been most sadly deficient, — not be- 
cause there have not been opportunities for 
criticism, (we have all the guarantees of the 
rights of assembly, free speech, and free press) 
but because criticism has been irresponsible 
and usually has had for its aims misleading 
the people in order that the ballot may be 
used for selfish ends. Our democracy has not 
provided for itself the guarantees necessary 
to the ascertainment of the truth in matters 
of public controversy; it has not set up a proce- 
dure for insuring political justice by establish- 
ing means that will insure independent re- 
sponsible inquiry, criticism, discussion and 
publicity. 

Our Publicity of '' Stinkhorn'^ Variety, 

Our publicity has been of the " stinkhorn " 
variety. I doubt not that most of you, while 

26 



LESSONS TO DEMOCRACY 

tramping in the woods, have met with the 
" stinkhorn", an edible mushroom wonder- 
fully pleasing in form, and attractive in color, 
which emits an odor suggesting animal filth 
or carrion. This odor attracts to the fungus 
blow-flies, scavenger-beetles, and other insects 
which revel in fllth, and after wallowing in the 
malodorous slime they crawl away carrying 
to their resting places " spores," which drop- 
ping about on friendly soil develop other 
" stinkhorns." Here is a thing in Nature 
which has capitalized the instincts of scavenger 
insects, thereby getting them to do its work. 
It does this by the use of misinformation of a 
kind that among humans oftentimes leads to 
very distressing results. 

The human desire for scandal is so intense 
that it overcomes the desire for truth. The 
blow-fly and the scavenger-beetle have proved 
the more scientific in that the first thing they 
do when they " smell " something is to go 
to the source, and finding that they have been 
misled they go their way. But not so with 
the human. In a summer colony, for example, 
Mrs. Jones goes to call on Mrs. Brown. Going 
by a wooded path that passes a spot near the 

27 



THE WAR — ITS PRACTICAL 

house where a " stinkhorn " is growing she 
smells something. She knows the smell. You 
can't fool her any more than you can the blow- 
fly, but she does not explore underneath the 
low hanging hemlock bough. She goes back 
and tells Mrs. Smith. Then Mrs. Smith calls, 
and as she passes the " stinkhorn " she detects 
the same smell. Having thus verified Mrs. 
Jones' suspicion, she confides in Mrs. White. 
In the meantime Mrs. Brown had also smelled 
something and her suspicion ends in her first 
firing the nursemaid and later the cook. Now 
Mr. Brown, coming out at the week-end, also 
smells something. He, like the others, does 
not investigate but loses confidence in his 
wife — thinking, if he is not so mean as to in- 
sinuate, that Mrs. Brown is so careless about 
sanitary conditions as to endanger the health 
of their children. 

Public Opinion Based on Misinformation. 

The illustration need not be carried farther. 
The point that I am making is that this is 
fairly typical . of the methods used in this 
country for making public opinion; that in 
our political system no adequate provision 

28 



LESSONS TO DEMOCRACY 

has been made for responsible, open-handed 
inquiry and pubHcIty; that we have no proce- 
dure for protecting our leaders and our people 
against stinkhorn-polltlcs. In our scheme of 
private justice, we have adopted a procedure 
which will require a person who accuses to 
face the accused — giving to each the oppor- 
tunity to come into a public forum, present 
the facts, and have a decision rendered on 
the evidence. This Is the thought which lies 
back of our jury system. But in our political 
system we have offered an Inducement to the 
selfish and designing to destroy the very foun- 
dations of democratic government by cultivat- 
ing In hidden places " stinkhorns " that finally 
in an Insidious fashion, which has become a 
high art, are used to put Into the discard those 
who honestly serve the public. 

Our Instruments of Democratic Control Have 
Been Put Out of Commission. 

Parliamentary bodies have been organized 
with a view to meting out political justice. 
We have the machinery for putting our leader- 
ship on trial, and for giving those who are 
accused by a critical opposition fair trial by 

29 



THE WAR — ITS PRACTICAL 

representatives of the people — by those who 
stand for the ideals of democracy. But we 
have not so used our representative bodies. 
On the contrary, we have done everything 
possible to crush the " opposition " to deprive 
the people of a fair trial of their leaders, to 
apply " gag " rules, with the result that we 
have irresponsible criticism and publicity, 
and irresponsible leadership. 

May I repeat therefore that the question 
as to whether the executive shall frame the 
budget must be considered from the viewpoint 
of the government which we have. We have 
never had responsible leadership. We have 
never had responsible criticism and publicity. 
We have never had a means for making the 
government responsive to the will of the 
people. We have never had responsible gov- 
ernment. In a government where these things 
do obtain, a discussion of the topic before this 
conference would be thought foolish. Such a 
topic would not even be considered of 
academic interest in France, England, Switzer- 
land, Italy, or even Japan. With them there 
could be only one answer: " Of course the 
executive should frame the budget; who else 

30 



LESSONS TO DEMOCRACY 



could do it with any intelligence; or if some- 
body else could, of what particular use would 
it be as a means of making the executive 
accountable?" Here in this country, be- 
cause we have not provided the means for 
holding the executive accountable for his 
proposals as well as his acts, we have for a 
century left this procedure out of account and 
now we are beginning to ask ourselves a ques- 
tion about what kind of a method of control 
we shall use without first deciding what kind 
of a political machine it is to which we are to 
attach a proposed instrument of control. 

We Built for Irresponsible GovernmenU 

As said before, we have built our political 
machinery in the thought that it is dangerous 
to have a prime mover; that we did not need 
to provide for responsible executive leadership; 
that all we needed to do was to choose " good " 
men without any experience (the less experi- 
enced the better) for fixed terms, then to trust 
to God till another election — with the result 
that we cumulate our grouches, accept as true 
the statements of irresponsible self-seeking 
persons who deal in half truths or lies without 

31 



THE WAR — ITS PRACTICAL 

any means given to officers to meet charges 
made against them in a way to protect them 
and the pubHc against being misrepresented 
or misled. Then we complain of distrust. We 
complain of distrust when our whole govern- 
mental fabric is consciously fram_ed on a theory 
of distrust. In the upbuilding of our ma- 
chinery of government we have distrusted 
centralized authority, and our constitution 
makers have distrusted the people. Fixed 
terms have been adopted for executives be- 
cause of distrust of a popular electorate; ex- 
ecutives have been deprived of power of 
leadership because of fear of usurpation; rep- 
resentative bodies have had their powers cur- 
tailed because they were distrusted; and be- 
cause when shorn of powers of leadership and 
deprived of all means of protection against 
misrepresentation, with no power either in 
their own hands or their representatives to 
develop and retain a constructive leadership 
that is trusted, and only so long as it has the 
support of a majority, the normal action at 
the end of each fixed executive term has been 
to sweep aside and relegate to the political 
graveyard every man who has come to know 

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LESSONS TO DEMOCRACY 

how to serve the public will, whether as head 
of the administration or as leader of a re- 
sponsible critical opposition — both of which 
functions are necessary to the upbuilding of 
an efficient public service that is responsive to 
the will of the people. 

Under such a system as this the only person 
who can continue in office on the political side 
is a sail-trimmer or a member of the repre- 
sentative body who makes good with his con- 
stituency by *' getting something " for his 
district — letting the executive take the kicks 
of the general electorate for waste and in- 
efficiency of the public service; making pious 
bows when the executive is being offered up as 
sacrifice to appease the wrath of the great 
God " Demos." 

Executive Budget Does Not Fit Irresponsible 
Government. 

Assuming, however, that we Americans 
wish to continue the kind of political machine 
such as we now have — a machine which in its 
fundamental structure does violence to every 
principle of organization for efficient co- 
operation, which has been plastered over with 

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THE WAR — ITS PRACTICAL 

every kind of a reform patch and temporizing 
device that ingenuity of impractical dreamers 
and self-seeking individuals who live on this 
sort of thing can invent — assuming that we 
do not wish to avail ourselves of the experience 
of democratic peoples who have demonstrated 
that strong constructive, executive leadership 
can be safely developed for welfare ends, be- 
cause it can be made responsive to the will 
of a majority — then if these premises be ac- 
cepted I most heartily join with those who 
contend that the budget should not be made 
by the executive. 

I would even go farther than they do and 
say that under such circumstances a budget 
cannot be made by the executive. And I say 
this also because of our experience. Since Ex- 
President Taft recommended the introduction 
of an executive budget in 1911, there has been 
an outcry for this as a remedy for legislative 
improvidence and misdirected effort. In 1912 
he actually submitted a budget which still 
lies in the dusty pigeon-hole of a Congress- 
ional committee. Statute laws have been 
passed making it the duty of the Executive 
to prepare and submit a " budget," but all 

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LESSONS TO DEMOCRACY 



these efforts have had about as much effect 
as if the governor of a steam engine had been 
screwed on to the fans of a wind mill; they 
have been almost entirely useless; until we 
recognize the constitutional weakness of our 
system as it has developed, such devices as 
these can prove nothing but expensive en- 
cumbrances. 

In This Contest We Must Demonstrate Our 
Right to Survive. 

At this time of great political stress, when 
the democracies of the world are in a struggle 
which puts them to the test, which calls them 
to face this great driving efficient of the Prus- 
sian autocratic war machine, we must demon- 
strate our right to survive. We, in our 
political impotence, with resources far be- 
yond those of any other nation, who find our- 
selves wholly without organized means for 
effectively massing and using our resources in 
a common cause ! We who when decision was 
made to enter this contest, instead of moving 
forward in order and with precision, had noth- 
ing but chaos at our seats of government ! 
We, who now face the prospect of wasting 

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THE WAR — ITS PRACTICAL 

millions of lives as well as billions of resources, 
holding our place while perfecting our political 
mechanism! In the sight of these things do 
we not need to look about us and if we cannot 
learn from our own past discomfiture and 
discontent at the wasteful management of our 
own internal affairs, must we not now in this 
crisis consider whether we can learn some- 
thing from the experience that our Allies 
gained at awful cost on the battlefront ? And 
must we not ultimately realize that it is not 
war-time adjustments which count most? 
Must not America accept the conclusion that 
there is the same need before us in time of 
peace that there is in time of war? If we have 
our government organized on wrong lines, 
is it not time for us to look truth squarely in 
the face? While bowing our heads in hu- 
mility, should not we as Americans and 
democrats ask ourselves whether any enter- 
prise requiring broad co-operation can be 
efiiciently managed without provision made 
for strong, intelligent " leadership " through 
which a discipline can be established and 
maintained that makes for " unity of effort? " 

36 



LESSONS TO DEMOCRACY 

Oficial Concessions of Weakness. 

Do we not concede the essential weakness 
of our whole political structure when Congress, 
from sheer necessity, makes President Wilson 
a dictator, throwing all constitutional guar- 
antees to the winds — do we not concede in 
this that there must be " unity of direction " 
if democracy is to maintain itself? And yet 
when we make this concession in time of 
great national emergency, see what a plight 
we are in. We are about as fit for meeting 
our responsibilities, for effectively using the 
human and material resources at the com- 
mand of the President, as would be the Har- 
vard football team if every one were permitted 
to play " on his own hook " until the day 
when it became necessary to meet the Sons of 
Eli the committee suddenly turned to the 
captain and said: " Now you have full power 
to command. The whole university is back of 
you ; go in and win." Nor can calling in a thou- 
sand successful players at some other game to 
stand by and " advise " the captain at such 
a time contribute anything but confusion. 

M. Painleve has stated the problem clearly; 
the great need of the Allies today, (after three 

37 



THE WAR — ITS PRACTICAL 

years of the most rugged training in arms, after 
numberless lives have been sacrificed and a 
world of treasure has been destroyed) the 
great need of the Allies is to find a way to 
overcome lack of the unity of direction and 
discipline which makes for success. They are 
learning In the struggle of the battle-line 
that while some of them had provided for a 
responsive leadership, they did not see the 
need for the development of the staff knowl- 
edge and line discipline which would make 
these nations most serviceable. 

France has proven to the world that strong, 
intelligent, efficient leadership can be made 
subservient to the ideals of democracy. Eng- 
land has proven that democracy may safely 
give to leadership powers unrestricted except 
by one principle, that it must retain the "con- 
fidence " of a majority of the representatives 
of the people or " resign " — the means of 
enforcement being the withdrawal of supplies. 

Constitutional Changes Unnecessary — We 
Need Only to Change Our Minds. 

And we can do this in our national govern- 
ment in a very simple manner. If the need 

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LESSONS TO DEMOCRACY 

were clearly seen and the people demanded, it 
could be brought about without changing the 
constitution — without even the enactment of 
a statute. This could be done by Congress 
simply by changing its own " rules." If Con- 
gress were to require the cabinet to appear 
before them in an open public way, to come 
before them as a " committee of the whole," 
there to give an account of past acts and to 
explain proposals for the future, making the 
vote of supplies contingent on the support of 
the majority, we could at once have strong 
leadership and democratic control. What 
would happen in that case if the cabinet failed 
to get the support of a majority of the repre- 
sentative body ^ Would not the President in 
that event be forced to reorganize his cabinet ^ 
We can have strong and responsible govern- 
ment. But this will never come until there is a 
popular demand which will over-ride the pow- 
ers which have been gradually appropriated 
by some forty different congressional commit- 
tees that in effect run so many cross sections 
of the administration and which under a rule 
of seniority makes Congress a veritable autoc- 
racy. 

39 



THE WAR — ITS PRACTICAL 

I am not here to discuss whether the Execu- 
tive should or should not frame the budget. 
I come before you to raise the question as to 
whether our history and experience with irre- 
sponsible government is not only not demo- 
cratic in that it is not responsive, but whether 
or not if we are to continue to disregard the 
primary essentials of successful co-operative 
enterprise, with the continued waste of both 
human and material resources incident to the 
increasing demands on our government as the 
only agency on which the people can depend 
for protection and the promotion of common 
welfare; whether a continuation of the in- 
capacity shown by American democracy must 
not mark us for failure; whether with the 
growing discontent and the cost of our in- 
efficiency the verdict of a misled, helpless, 
exploited people, unable to provide for them- 
selves the means of developing strong ef- 
fective leadership — a leadership competent 
to serve and to protect both itself and the 
people against the cunning of an Irresponsible 
opposition — r may not make the choice in 
favor of a benevolent despotism. 

To those who advocate the continuation of 

40 



LESSONS TO DEMOCRACY 

our system of legislative, irresponsible autoc- 
racy, I leave the defense of institutions and 
methods that with the increasing realization 
of their impotence the people on almost every 
election for the last fifty years have con- 
demned. 



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LIBRftRY OF CONGRESS 



020 914 273 9 



